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Mechanising the Information War – Machine Research and Development and Bletchley 
Park 
Christopher Smith 
 
Abstract 
The Bombe machine was a key device in the cryptanalysis of the ciphers created by the 
machine system widely employed by the Axis powers during the Second World War – 
Enigma. The Bombe machine was initially designed Britain by scientists in primary 
cryptanalysis agency, the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. The 
machines were then mass produced by the British Tabulating Machine Company in 
Britain, and by the National Cash Register Company in the United States of America. The 
design, development and mass production of the machine was a fraught process 
dependent on support from scientists and bureaucrats within the agency, but more 
importantly the agency was only moved to mechanise, and subsequently professionalise, 
this key function in its operations when met with a series of major crises. The result was 
an unplanned ad hoc process of designing, building and operating the machines. This was 
representative of the wider process of mechanisation within Bletchley Park, one of the 
most important and renowned technological centres to emerge in Britain during the 
Second World War.  
 
Key Words: Bletchley Park, Bombe, Mechanisation, Enigma, Cryptanalysis,                   
Intelligence. 
 
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Dr Siân Nicholas, Professor 
Christopher Grey and Professor Iwan Rhys Morus, for their helpful comments; and 
Kristopher Lovell for suggesting the title. 
In time of peace there is little stimulus to invent equipment for which there is no general 
demand. … governments are by habit content with what they have, unless some major 
crisis forces them to pay closer attention to security and speed.1 
- The Internal History of British Security Coordination (1945) 
 
During the Second World War Bletchley Park, the primary war station of the Government 
Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), was a hive of activity. Each month tens of thousands 
of enciphered Axis wireless messages were intercepted by Britain’s wireless interception 
service – the Y Service. For instance, in November 1942 approximately 40,000 messages 
were intercepted in the United Kingdom.2 These messages arrived at Bletchley Park for 
deciphering, translation and sorting. Useful intelligence was distributed to appropriate 
Ministries and military commands. In order to deal with this volume of traffic Bletchley 
Park constantly expanded, increasing in staff numbers until the final months of the war, 
adding new sections to its operational apparatus, and overseeing the expansion of existing 
sections. The agency also adopted new methods of approaching its work and 
administration; mechanising many of its key processes by installing ingenious new 
technologies, often custom designed, built and adapted, which offered automated 
                                                 
1
   Nigel West (ed.), British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the 
Americas 1940-45 (London, 1998) 454-455 
2
   Johnson, Kerry and Gallehawk, John (eds.), Figuring it Out at Bletchley Park: 1939-1945 
(Redditch, 2007), 170. 
solutions to the increasingly complex and increasingly ubiquitous mechanical cipher 
systems employed by the Axis powers.  
 
This article examines one aspect of the mechanisation of GC&CS, the partial 
mechanisation of the cryptanalysis of messages enciphered by the famous Enigma cipher 
machines.3 It seeks to examine how the administrative and organisational structures 
within GC&CS reacted and adapted to meet the changing pressures of an increasingly 
mechanised “information war”. The article also considers why the agency developed in 
the manner in which did. GC&CS was, from its inception in 1919, an increasingly 
professional organisation, which sought out and recruited specialists in linguistics, 
history, classics, and other literary disciplines and later mathematics, physics and business 
administration; a clear shift in direction from the arts to the sciences. The historian Jon 
Agar sees the rise of scientists and technocratic specialists, within Civil Service as a 
                                                 
3
   Other aspects of GC&CS’s mechanisation have been explored elsewhere, for instance the 
massive mechanical data storage system, comprised of hundreds of thousands of punch cards, has been 
examined in some detail by Rodney Brunt. Similarly, the collaboration between British Security Co-
ordination and GC&CS, to develop Britain’s primary wartime machine cipher system, Typex has been 
explored by John Ferris. Ferris also discusses the development of the Rockex II cipher system - an 
important electronic machine cipher system developed during the war and utilised in the early years of the 
Cold War. Rodney Brunt, ‘Indexes at the Government Code and Cypher School, Bletchley Park, 1940-
1945’,  in Boyd W. Rayward and Mary Ellen Bowden (eds.), The History and Heritage of Scientific and 
Technological Information Systems: proceedings of the 2002 conference of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology  (Medford:  NJ, 2004) 291-299; John Ferris, Intelligence and 
Strategy: Selected Essays (London, 2005),  138-180. 
whole, as a key driving force of mechanisation and bureaucratic professionalisation 
within Britain’s structures of governance, citing Bletchley Park as an example.4 This 
article builds on that interpretation, suggesting that while technocratic specialists within 
Bletchley Park facilitated mechanisation, the agency was partly, in fact, resistant to 
changing the existing structures and sometimes hostile to new technologies, and that 
mechanisation owed as much to wartime tests5 and opportunities as it did to the 
professionalising influence of scientists. The agency can be broadly, though as will be 
shown there was considerable overlap, split into two different camps: those cryptanalysts 
from an earlier generation, typically academics drawn from the arts faculties who 
approached the problem of codebreaking through an examination of language and 
linguistics; and a later generation of mathematicians, scientists and managers who were 
arguably more open to new techniques, including mechanisation. 
 
Specifically, change only occurred in response to overwhelming external and internal 
logistical and political pressures. The result was that mechanisation and 
professionalisation occurred in a haphazard and ad hoc fashion, because the agency was 
typically resistant to and, given the weight and rapid emergence of problems, incapable of 
                                                 
4
   Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer (Cambridge: 
MA, 2003). 
5
   A theme discussed in the context of wartime social and cultural change, see Arthur Marwick, 
Britain in the Century of Total War: war, peace and social change, 1900-1967 (London, 1968). 
long-term planning.  In order to illustrate this unplanned and ad hoc process of 
institutional evolution, this article will draw upon the development of the Bombe. The 
Bombe machines were complex pieces of apparatus designed to aid in the cryptanalysis of 
the famous Enigma cipher system.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given the significance of wartime cryptanalysis to Allied prosecution of 
the war, there has been significant study of the work of GC&CS. The majority of this 
literature has been dedicated to the question of what influence Allied signals intelligence 
had upon the outcome of the Second World War. This trend was set by the very first full 
length English language book to be written on the subject; the memoir of the intelligence 
officer F. W. Winterbotham.6  Subsequent memoirs and histories largely continued with 
the same focus.7 It was not until the publication of the memoir of the cryptanalyst Gordon 
Welchman in 1986, that some of the questions regarding the technical methods employed 
to break Axis ciphers began to be addressed. Interestingly, Welchman, who was also a 
senior manager at Bletchley Park, also gave some insight into the evolving bureaucracy at 
Bletchley Park and how the structure of the agency facilitated the work of the 
cryptanalysts. Importantly, Welchman also provided his recollections of the construction 
                                                 
6
   F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret: The Inside Story of Operation Ultra, Bletchley Park and 
Enigma (London, 1974, 2000). 
7
   For examples see: Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra: the Full Story of Ultra and its Impact 
on World War II (London, 1981); Ewen Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U (London, 1977); Ronald Lewin, 
Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story (London, 1978, 1980); Hinsley, F. H., Thomas, E. E., Ransom, C. F. 
G., and Knight, R. C., British Intelligence in the Second World War, 5 vols. (London, 1979-1990). 
of the Bombe machines. Relatively recent studies of Bletchley Park and GC&CS have 
expanded our understanding of the agencies structures,8 and the technical specifications 
of its machines,9 but very little has been said regarding the actual process of constructing 
the machines, those who advocated building them, and the extent to which opposition 
impeded and delayed construction. No study has attempted to map the influence of social 
and cultural developments within the agency and the process of mechanisation by the 
agency. Filling this gap yields an interesting story in of itself, but more importantly it also 
serves as a vehicle to test various theses within the field of wartime science and 
technology, which most certainly have considered the influence of wider society and 
culture in the development of technology.    
 
Relatively recent work regarding the attitude of the British state towards scientific and 
technological development in wartime has produced interesting, if conflicting studies. 
David Edgerton, for instance, has argued that the British state was militant, scientific and 
technocratic, and that the importance of mechanised warfare and industry was encouraged 
from the highest levels of government. For instance, Edgerton argues that the Civil 
Service, and government, rather than being dominated by men with an education in the 
classics, who did not understand science, and who were resistant to new technology, in 
                                                 
8
   Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The complete story of codebreaking in World War II 
(London, 2000, 2001); R. A. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra and the End of Secure 
Ciphers (Cambridge, 2005).  
9
   Paul Gannon, Colossus: Bletchley Park’s Greatest Secret (London, 2007); B. Jack Copeland, 
Colossus: The Secrets of Bletchley Park’s Codebreaking Computers (Cambridge, 2010). 
fact, contained a powerful core of scientifically educated technocrats. Moreover, Edgerton 
argues that the British state was, in fact, highly technologically advanced by the standards 
of the day, militaristic, and far better prepared for war than often assumed. Moreover, the 
centrality of science and technology was championed from the highest levels of Britain’s 
wartime government.10  
 
Thus, Edgerton writes, “Wartime Britain saw a quite extraordinary cult of invention and 
inventor, whose high priest was the Prime Minister himself.11 Gadget factories of all sorts 
flourished under his leadership, driving others to exasperation.”12 Moreover, the receptive 
authorities were not resistant to new technologies, but found themselves in the position of 
“choosing between any number of novel machines.”13 Importantly, Edgerton’s emphasis 
                                                 
10
   Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War 
(London, 2012). 
11
   Evidently Churchill’s own education was no bar to his belief in the power of scientists to provide 
solutions to Britain’s military problems. He was educated at several independent schools prior to attended 
Harrow School and later the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. According to Henry Pelling’s biography of 
Churchill, the future Prime Minister’s Latin was poor and his grasp of mathematics and French mediocre. 
He failed his first attempt to pass the Sandhurst entrance exam, and, even following an intensive ‘crammer’ 
course, was unable to qualify for the infantry and initially made do with the cavalry and its less exacting 
entry standards.  Henry Pelling, Winston Churchill (Ware, 1977), 32-37. 
12
   Edgerton, op. cit. (ref. 6), 234. 
13
   Edgerton, op. cit. (ref. 6), 235. 
on Churchill, and other senior figures within Britain’s wartime establishment, is 
suggestive of a receptiveness to technology driven from above, granting scientifically and 
technologically minded individuals a considerable amount of leeway and resources to arm 
Britain’s military services, mechanise her apparatus of state, and modernise her industry.  
 
Jon Agar, in his history of the British Civil Service, argues that the government is like a 
machine.14 That the manner in which the government, and Civil Service departments, 
operate employ machine-like processes, and that senior members of the Civil Service, 
deliberately characterised the bureaucracy of state in these terms. The purpose being to 
generate trust in the Civil Service; machines are impartial, efficient, and, of course, 
“mechanical” in their operation.  Furthermore, the “government machine” also operated a 
policy of the physical, as opposed to metaphorical, mechanisation of its processes during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus the Civil Service, already operating like a 
machine and encouraging that view of itself, began the process of mechanising its work. 
This process of mechanisation, Agar argues, was spearheaded by an increasingly 
influential middle-ranking tier of technocratic specialists within the Civil Service and, in 
particular, the Treasury. This technocratic group was comprised of scientific specialists 
who persuaded their more senior colleagues, the Civil Service mandarins often with an 
education in the classics as opposed to the sciences, to adopt their policy of 
                                                 
14
   Agar, op. cit. (ref. 5). Of course, Agar is not alone in examining organisations and bureaucracies 
as machines. The metaphor has been discussed and considered in the context of organization theory. See, 
Morgan, Images of Organization (Thousand Oaks: CA, 1984, 2005), 369-374. 
mechanisation, which the mandarins agreed to on the basis that it would make work more 
efficient and less costly. Thus, the mechanisation of government was directed and driven 
from within, by a group of powerful technologically minded specialists.  
 
One of the key case studies deployed by Agar in his analysis of the growth of 
mechanisation in government is Bletchley Park. Agar argues that over the course of the 
war GC&CS had “transformed from a collegiate to an industrialised bureaucracy: an 
organization marked by an intricate division of labour, very high staff numbers, an 
emphasis on through-put, and innovative mechanization at bottlenecks, all directed to 
speeding up and making more efficient processes of manipulating symbols.”15 Agar’s 
model is a useful one to consider within the context of this discussion of the development 
of GC&CS’s administration and its process of mechanisation, however it is not without 
problems. Like Agar, Alan Turing’s biographer, Alan Hodges also considered the 
professionalization of GC&CS. Hodges pointed to the arrival of mathematicians as 
having a professionalising and transformative influence on the agency.16 This conclusion 
is, however, problematic, because, contrary to the common assumption that GC&CS 
began recruiting mathematicians in the months immediately prior to war, the agency had 
in fact, been recruiting a small number of mathematicians since the early 1930s at the 
very latest.17 This begs the question of why the transformative, mechanising and 
                                                 
15
   Agar, op. cit. (ref. 5), 414. 
16
   Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: the Enigma (New York, 1992), 549. 
17
professionalising impact of mathematicians had not occurred during the interwar years? 
Of course, number of mathematicians employed by GC&CS increased rapidly during the 
war, and particular mathematicians, like Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman both of 
whom played a major role in the development of the Bombe machine, were recruited in 
1939. It is undeniable that both men played a major role in facilitating and championing 
the mechanisation of GC&CS; however, it is clear that the arrival of scientists alone 
could not facilitate mechanisation which did not occur until wartime.  
 
The organization theorist Christopher Grey, rather than proposing a linear development 
within GC&CS, highlights the importance of the type of working being conducted and 
the autonomy of workers. Thus, while areas of work deemed to be “low skilled”, such as 
machine operation, took on the characteristics outlined by Agar, “highly skilled” sections, 
such as that of cryptanalysts and translators retained many of the characteristics of 
collegiate system of the pre-war agency. Grey presents an image of GC&CS’s different 
sections, run on different principles as described above, being “twisted together” over the 
course of the war.18 Grey’s model is useful as it highlights the often ad hoc of GC&CS’s 
growth, professional and mechanical in some areas of its work, but unorthodox, 
unregimented and, perhaps, even anarchic in others particularly those areas deemed to 
require leeway to lubricate the wheels of creative and intellectual expertise. As we shall 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
 Alistair Denniston to C. E. D. Peters, 26 April, 1932, HW 72/9, TNA.  
18
   Christopher Grey, Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organization 
Studies (Cambridge 2012), 213-240. 
see, this freedom and attitude within GC&CS was provided in abundance to GC&CS’s 
technical experts and had a considerable impact upon the development of the Bombe 
machine and later adapted models. However, Grey’s model is incomplete and applies 
primarily to the development of GC&CS’s organisational structure. The impact of these 
developments on, or even whether they apply at all to, the process of mechanisation 
within GC&CS is all but omitted. Thus, while Grey’s model is useful in understanding 
GC&CS’s overall organisational development, further thought is needed in understanding 
the process of cryptanalytic mechanisation during the war.  
 
The majority of the historiography discussed thus far has revolved around relatively 
recent studies. Of course, historians have long been interested with the relationship 
between the state, state institutions, and science and technology. In the period before 
1990s, in particular during the 1970s and 1980s, a number of historians, observing the 
relative waning of Britain as a first-rate military and industrial power, sought to explain 
and understand this apparent “decline” during the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.19 Part of this decline, they argue, was a result of British industry and the 
government’s failure to appreciate and adopt new technologies. Indeed, Barnett argued 
                                                 
19
   For instance see Correlli Barnett’s trilogy on the subject. Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of 
British Power (London, 1972); Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a 
Great Nation (London, 1987); Correlli Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 1945-
1950 (London, 1995). For other examples, see Martin J. Weiner, English Culture and the Decline of the 
Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Cambridge, 1981); Michael  Dintenfass, The Decline of Industrial Britain: 
1870-1980 (London, 1992). 
that, during this period, politicians and civil servants were actively resistant to emergent 
technology. Barnett, looking back to the mid-nineteenth century, suggests that the root of 
this technological ignorance was to be found in the education of Britain’s elite – the 
public school system, from which senior civil servants were drawn. The Civil Service 
was, in Barnett’s estimation, filled with men who had been recruited from Britain’s elite 
public school system and universities, Oxbridge in particular. These establishments 
placed an emphasis on a classical education, with particular emphasis on Greek and 
Roman, with lesser attention and status paid to modern subjects, such as history and 
modern European languages. Mathematics, physics and chemistry, were largely omitted 
from their curricula. Where science was admitted, it was of a low level.20  The result was 
that the brightest boys left school, and in turn Oxford and Cambridge Universities, with a 
particular set of skills and education that excluded, and undervalued the sciences. Thus, 
“British educational neglect in the nineteenth century artificially created a stupid, 
lethargic, unambitious, enterprising people for the twentieth century. The consequences 
were insidiously to affect many fields of national performance.”21 Thus, the educated 
elite, many of whom joined the ranks of the Civil Service, had little education in, or 
understanding of, science and technology. This, in Barnett’s view, led to stagnation in 
terms of technological foresight within government and hostility towards technological 
change. The result was that “[T]he values and world view of this British governing class 
                                                 
20
   Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), 31. 
21
   Barnett, op. cit. (ref. 20), 105. 
were thus profoundly pre-industrial, conservative, nostalgic.”22  Furthermore, “the 
governing class’s whole ethos and conditioning made it static in outlook rather than 
dynamic, seeking continuity before change.”23  
 
Thus, in the minds of those historians who see Britain as having entered a period of 
decline, there was an absence of sponsorship of scientific and technological development 
in Britain during the late 19th century and into the 20th century. In no small part this was, 
they suggest, a result of a failure of the upper-echelons of Government and the civil 
service to appreciate the merit and potential of investing in scientific and technological 
projects. Of course, this thesis stands in direct contrast to later historical research, 
conducted by the likes of David Edgerton, who argued the precise opposite. Meanwhile, 
as noted, Jon Agar observes a powerful and technocratic group of specialists within the 
civil service who actively mechanised the service from within. It is clear from this 
research that, contrary to the declinist thesis, that the British government was not hostile 
towards technological advances, and certainly not during the Second World War.24 
                                                 
22
   Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation 
(London, 1987), 221. 
23
   Barnett, op. cit. (ref. 22), 221. 
24
   For instance see: Jose Harris, ‘Enterprise and Welfare State: A Comparative Perspective’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, 40 (1990), 175-195;  Jim Tomlinson, ‘Correlli 
Barnett’s History: the Case of the Marshall Aid’, Twentieth Century British History, 8, no. 2 (1997), 222-
238; David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge, 2005). 
Technological solutions to complex problems, such as the Bombe machine as a response 
to mechanised cryptography, were certainly embraced by the British government and, as 
this article will show, substantial funding and manpower was provided to the project of 
mechanising cryptanalysis.  
 
Clearly then, the ‘declinist’ thesis has only limited utility in examining the construction of the 
Bombe machines; not only was GC&CS, as an agency, able to draw upon significant resources 
and support from the British state, but it was able to channel those resources into the 
development of novel technologies designed by professional scientists. However, it is certainly 
the case that the senior figures within GC&CS, who were drawn from an ‘old guard’ of GC&CS 
recruit and often reflected the educational background of Barnett’s caricature civil servant, 
were often the most apathetic when it came to adopting new methods and technologies. As a 
result, the explanation that because Britain was a technocratic militant state, it naturally 
followed that its scientific military institutions would be at the forefront of mechanisation 
requires further nuance. Meanwhile, Agar’s conclusion that mechanisation occurred because of 
the arrival of scientific mechanisers, with a technocratic ideology, also fails to fully encapsulate 
the process of mechanisation. Rather than embracing technocratic solutions, such as the 
Bombe machine, Bletchley Park’s senior staff members, were, in fact, typically 
indifferent and prone to technological inertia; building machines, upgrading them, and 
efficiently utilising them, only when existing measures were stretched to breaking point. 
Instead, the agency invariably took the line of least resistance, adopting mechanisation 
only when all else failed, resulting in a distinctly ad hoc and unplanned process of 
mechanisation, achieved only in fits and starts, which only occurred at moments of major 
institutional stress brought about by the wider pressures of war. 
 
To understand the process of mechanisation at Bletchley Park, it is necessary to examine how the GC&CS’s 
senior staff and government sponsors were forced to reconsider their attitudes towards technology and the 
role of machines, and how wartime developments created opportunities for Bletchley’s scientists .  
* 
Britain’s cryptanalysis services began the interwar period with a clearly defined emphasis 
on academia. Academics, particularly those scholars who specialised in classics, 
languages and history, had, during the First World War proven ideal candidates to solve 
the problem of cryptography. They were well educated, understood the mechanics of 
language and communication, and were professionally engaged in the work of teasing 
meaning from complex, alien and damaged sources of information.25  They also brought 
with them the collegiate, and often anarchic, culture of the universities from which they 
had been drawn and, particularly in the case of Dillwyn Knox (perhaps the greatest 
cryptanalyst of GC&CS’s “Old Guard”) complained bitterly when the agency attempted 
to professionalise and compartmentalise their work.26 Furthermore, during the Second 
World War the manner in which GC&CS operated did indeed change. While the sections 
housing the cryptanalysts and linguists remained forever tied to the university common 
rooms from which many of the senior staff had been drawn, many of the new sections to 
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   Mavis Batey, Dilly: The Man Who Broke Enigmas (London, 2009), 20. 
26
   Michael Smith, Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park (London, 2004), 126. 
emerge within GC&CS were very different. These sections were the natural by-product of 
the mechanisation of cryptography and the increasing ubiquity of wireless 
communication. Dealing with the new technologies being deployed by the Axis powers 
required necessitated a mechanical response in the fields of cryptanalysis, data storage 
and manipulation, communication, and general administration. Each of these newly 
mechanised functions of the agency required new sections and an increasingly large pool 
of staff members. This was all precipitated by the development of the Enigma cipher 
machine. 
 
A commercial model of the Enigma machine, designed by the German electrical Engineer 
Arthur Scherbius, first entered the market in the early 1920s. It was not the first machine 
cipher system to have been patented or marketed, and for the first few years the machine 
failed to find the market that Scherbius had hoped for. However, in 1926 the German 
Navy adopted a modified variant of the system, and by the outbreak of war in 1939 
various different Enigma systems had become ubiquitous throughout the German state 
and military agencies.  
 
The Enigma machine resembled a typewriter. The purpose of the machine was to allow 
an operator to press a key on the machines keyboard and generate a different letter 
seemingly at random. The machine worked by creating an electrical signal, each time a 
key was depressed, which would light a corresponding letter on a lamp board located 
above the keyboard. Between the keys and the lamps, lay a series of three rotors, each 
with 26 potential positions representing letters of the alphabet, and each rotor position 
creating a different electrical pathway. The machine also included a reflector, so once the 
electrical signal had passed through the machine, it would be returned back through the 
rotors and thus through an entirely different pathway. The German military Enigma 
machines also included a Steckerverbindungen, a plug board, allowing the operator to 
manually plug a letter to a different corresponding lamp, adding an extra layer of 
complexity.27 Moreover, each time a key was depressed one or more rotors would move 
forward a position, thus the same key could be depressed multiple times and each 
occasion lighting a different corresponding letter. Unless the recipient of a message knew 
the precise configuration of the machine, or “key”, which had generated the message all 
the reader would have was a meaningless series of letters.  
 
For its day, the machine offered considerable advantages. It was easily mass-produced, it 
was relatively small and light making it portable, and it offered a high degree of security. 
To make matters more complex, it was also relatively easily modified, and various 
branches of the German state adopted their own customised version or variant of the 
Enigma system. Thus, these variants of Enigma were typically unique to the agency 
which had adopted them, heavily upgraded and generally deemed by the agencies in 
question to be unbreakable28 – according to the internal history of GC&CS commissioned 
at the end of the war, this was also a view shared by Britain’s cryptanalysts in during the 
                                                 
27
   Marian Rejewski,  ‘Mathematical Solution of the Enigma Cipher’, trans. Christopher Kasparek, 
Cryptologia, 6, no. 1 (1982): 1-18, 2. 
28
   Ratcliff, op. cit. (ref. 8), 4-23.  
latter part of the interwar period.29 GC&CS’s cryptanalysts concluded that if Enigma 
messages were to be read, and read on a suitably regular and swift basis to derive any 
useful intelligence, the agency might need to develop an “elaborate apparatus which had 
not yet been designed.”30 In other words, the mechanical revolution in cipher technology 
would require a similar mechanical revolution in the profession of cryptanalysis.  
 
The British were not alone in that assessment, the Polish Cipher Bureau had come to the 
same conclusion and by 1938 had developed a mechanical device they called the Bomba. 
With this device the Poles enjoyed some success against some of the German military 
Enigma systems at least until July 1939 when the Germans upgraded their systems.31 
However, aside from speculation, it was not until the British learned of the Polish 
successes that serious consideration was given to mechanical aids in tacking the Enigma 
problem. Indeed, comparatively little consideration had been given to Enigma at all up 
until that point. 
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   Frank Birch, The Official History of Sigint, vol. 1 (part 1), John Jackson (ed.) (Milton Keynes, 
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Kew (TNA). Frank Birch, ‘History of British Sigint, 1914-1945', HW 43/1-2, TNA. 
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   Birch, The Official History of Sigint, vol. 1 (part 1), 20. 
31
   Birch, The Official History of Sigint, vol. 1 (part 1), 20. 
In retrospect, given that the Enigma system had been adopted by elements of the German 
military as early as 1926 and by the mid-1930s was becoming increasingly ubiquitous it is 
surprising that GC&CS did not employ its resources on the problem until the late 1930s. 
As Birch noted, “it was not until May 1938 that, in naval Section GC&CS, a German 
subsection, consisting of one officer and one lady clerk, neither of them a cryptanalyst, 
was set up to analyse the traffic.”32 The cause of this limited attention to the problem was 
two-fold, firstly GC&CS was preoccupied with the problems posed by Imperial Japan and 
fascist Italy, and secondly because the Enigma system was advanced beyond the 
capabilities of GC&CS to tackle at that time. 33 Such was the pessimism within GC&CS, 
particularly when it came to the most challenging variant of the German Enigma systems, 
that of the German Navy, was widely believed to be unbreakable. There were only two 
individuals who took exception to this otherwise ubiquitous belief; these were Frank 
Birch and Alan Turing. According to the cryptanalyst Hugh Alexander, latterly the 
commander of Hut 8, the GC&CS section tasked with the campaign against the ciphers 
employed by the German Navy, the reasons they differed from the rest of GC&CS were 
two-fold.  
Birch thought it could be broken because it had to be broken and Turing thought it 
could be broken because it would be so interesting to break it. Whether or not 
these reasons were logically satisfactory they imbued those who held them with a 
determination that the problem should be solved and it is to the pertinacity and 
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force that, in utterly different ways, both of them showed that success was 
ultimately due.34 
 
Giving a further insight into Turing’s attitude, A. P. Mahon, a fellow Bletchley Park staff 
member, recorded in the internal history of Hut 8 written in 1945, that “When Turing 
joined the organization in 1939 no work was being done on Naval Enigma and he himself 
became interested in it ‘because no one else was doing anything about it and I could have 
it to myself’.”35  
 
The result was that GC&CS came late to attack the problem of Enigma, and still later to 
the development of a machine with the Enigma problem in mind. It was not until after the 
war had begun, in October 1939 that development of the Bombe began and May 1940 
that the first prototype Bombe machine was delivered to Bletchley Park.36 The machines 
themselves were large electro-mechanical devices designed to help cryptanalysts discover 
the rotor positions of the Enigma machines. The Bombe effectively consisted of a series 
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of three rows of 36 rotating drums, the drums replicating the function of an Enigma 
machine. These drums, as well as vast quantities of internal wiring, were housed in a 
large bronze cabinet over six feet in height, seven feet in width and two feet in depth.  
 
Part of the problem with the development of such technologies was that the machines 
were extremely expensive by the standard of the day. For instance, the project to design 
and development of the Bombe machines was granted a budget of £100,000.37 This led to 
considerable opposition from within the agency for the design and construction of the 
machines.  As Mahon explained, 
 
Unfortunately the Bombe was an expensive apparatus and it was far from certain 
that it would work or, even if the Bombe itself worked, that it would enable us to 
break Enigma. Its original production, and above all the acceptance of a scheme 
for large scale production, was the subject of long and bitter battles and Hut 8, and 
of course, Hut 6, owe very much to Commander Travis and to a lesser extent to 
Mr. Birch, for the energy and courage with which they sponsored its production.38 
 
Of course, neither Birch nor Travis were technocratic expert mechanisers. Both of them 
were products of an earlier cryptanalytic era, the First World War with its emphasis on 
classics and language as opposed to mathematics and engineering, and resultantly neither 
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were trained mathematicians and scientists. As noted, Birch was an historian by trade, 
while Travis had been recruited into cryptanalytic work from the ranks of Royal Navy.39  
They looked to mechanical solutions to the Enigma problem, as Alexander noted of 
Birch, “because it had to be broken”. The issue was one of necessity dictated by the 
escalating problems posed by the war, primarily that Britain’s chief opposing power, Nazi 
Germany, had adopted a machine cipher system that could not be quickly broken without 
mechanical aids.  
 
The arrival of mechanical solutions, to speed up the process of cryptanalysis, in 1940 
heralded a new chapter in British cryptanalysis, and the almost lackadaisical attitude 
towards the problems posed by machine ciphers had come to a definite end. The 
evolution in British cryptanalysis heralded by the development of these machines, was 
certainly quickly appreciated by the cryptanalysts. The arrival of the prototype in April 
1940 was followed, in August, by an improved model. By the summer of 1941, the 
Bombes were deemed to have proven their worth and production had begun in earnest.40 
By the end of the war in Europe some 200 machines had been built.41 
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However, all was not smooth sailing. The machines, throughout 1940 and 1941 existed 
only in minimal numbers.  By August 1941 still only six machines were available.42 This 
led to considerable bottlenecks as demand from the two main sections dealing with 
Enigma traffic, the German Naval cryptanalysis section in Hut 8 and the Army and Air 
section in Hut 6, both required machines. This led to various complaints being made 
regarding the allocation of the machines and more general disquiet regarding the slow 
rate at which machines were delivered. As Birch noted in a letter to Travis in August 
1940, “Turing has stated categorically that with 10 machines he could be sure of breaking 
Enigma and keeping it broken. Well can't we have 10 machines?”43  
 
The cause of these delays was partly because it took considerable time and expertise to 
build the complex machines. To provide an idea of the complexity, it is worth noting that 
each machine contained approximately a million soldered connections and ten miles of 
wire.44 GC&CS had contracted the British Tabulating Machine Company (BTM) to build 
much of its machinery, including the Bombe machines. However, in 1940 BTM was 
struggling to provide the production capacity to fulfil all of the tasks GC&CS demanded 
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of it. In November 1940, for instance, BTM wrote to GC&CS stating that unless GC&CS 
reduced its orders, either of Bombes or alternatively of other equipment, production 
would be delayed.45 Meanwhile, BTM was not solely contracted to work on GC&CS’s 
materials, and had government orders, of high priority, which also demanded its 
manufacturing resources. The result of these combined pressures unavoidably led to 
problems of prioritisations.46  The cost of each individual machine, after the initial 
substantial cost to design and build the prototype machines was also relatively high. In 
December 1940, when GC&CS contacted BTM regarding placing an order for a further 
12 machines, BTM quoted a base figure of £7,500 per machine.47 Given that the annual 
salary of a cryptanalyst, of the Civil Service rank of Junior Assistant, was between £260 
and £400, the cost of 12 machines was much as the annual cost of 225 cryptanalysts.48 
Furthermore, according to GC&CS estimates made in late July 1942, each machine 
required approximately 10 staff, comprised of operators and mechanics, all of whom 
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required accommodation, rations and pay, massively inflating the investment required to 
mechanise the exploitation of Enigma traffic.49 
 
Looking at the issue retrospectively A. P. Mahon wrote in 1945 a short summary of the 
difficulties, noting, 
 
A further difficulty was that the Bombes - essential to complete the break on 
modern keys - did not start to arrive until the summer of 1940 and the German Air 
and Army section working on Enigma (Hut 6) also needed these machines. Thus 
the testing of even one crib, supposing this to be available, presented a 
considerable problem. … 
Failing a pinch or a really large number of Bombes there was little hope of 
any progress on up to date material.50 
 
The arrival of the machines generated disputes regarding which service, the Army, Air or 
Navy, should have priority of use, was met with the same ad hoc attitude as displayed by 
GC&CS when faced with the problem of Enigma and the development of the Bombe 
machines. Little planning for the distribution of machine time was evident, and it was not 
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until 1942 that serious attempt at establishing an administrative infrastructure to allocate 
Bombe time was established.51  
 
Given that the first Bombe machine was delivered to Bletchley Park around two years 
previously, and that the early Bombe period in Enigma cryptanalysis was problematic due 
to limited numbers of machines, the failure of the agency to adopt a system in which to 
efficiently organise Bombe time is remarkable. Despite the severity of these problems, the 
agency was willing to ignore them, without instituting administrative measures, for an 
exceptionally lengthy period of time. So why, after two years, did the agency determine to 
institute a change at that point? The internal histories of GC&CS provide few answers. 
Alexander notes that “sudden demands” for machine time by Hut 8 would “seriously 
disrupt” the work of its sister Enigma cryptanalysis section, Hut 6. Firstly, it therefore 
seems reasonable to speculate that, despite the growing number of Bombe machines, the 
impact of these disruptions had increased in number and intensity. Secondly, the 
introduction of this measure was at least partially a product of the wider administrative 
revolution within the agency – the February 1942 reorganisation of GC&CS.52  
                                                 
51
   There is dispute among the internal histories of GC&CS precisely when this arrangement took 
shape, Alexander suggests that the system was adopted in the spring summer period of 1942, while Birch 
states that it was adopted in early 1942. Alexander, Cryptographic history of work on the German Naval 
Enigma (no date, c. 1945), HW 25/1, TNA, 37; Birch, The Official History of Sigint, Vol. 1 (part 2) and 
Vol. 2, 101. 
52
 *** 
 
The reorganisation of GC&CS was prompted by considerable dissatisfaction both within 
GC&CS and from its client ministries with the organisational apparatus within GC&CS - 
of which the failure to produce an adequate system for distributing Bombe time was 
symptomatic. The consistent bottle-necks within key GC&CS processes, such as Bombe 
allocation, created by an increasing volume of intercepted wireless traffic and the failure 
of the agency to acquire sufficient materiel and workers, to match these increases made it 
increasingly difficult for the agency to produce enough material to satisfy its customers.53 
These problems, combined with a series of managerial disputes within GC&CS, led to 
overhaul of the administration of GC&CS starting from the top. Alistair Denniston, the 
head of GC&CS since its formation in 1919, was sidelined and placed in command of 
GC&CS’s diplomatic and commercial section working from London. His erstwhile 
deputy, Edward Travis, took over command of Bletchley Park, and GC&CS’s efforts to 
read Axis military traffic.  
 
Travis’ promotion led to a great many changes within GC&CS. Several heads of key 
sections, such as Alan Turing, who provided key insights into the work of cryptanalysis 
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but was a poor manager, were replaced and new administrative systems, such as the 
“Bombe control” committee, were established. However, as Christopher Grey notes, this 
solution to the problem of Bombe time was far from guaranteed to be a success and, 
importantly, that the various parties involved had to come up with their “own solution” – 
highlighting the ad hoc nature of the solution.54 In the end it was successful, in part, Grey 
argues, because the committee was comprised by individuals who were in many cases 
already friends and had been so since before the war. Therefore, inter-service rivalry, 
which had exacerbated the problem in the first place, was not as prominent within the 
committee as it might have been and was elsewhere at Bletchley Park.55  
 
Meanwhile, GC&CS was able to recruit more staff and Bombe production was 
accelerated. For instance, from December 1940 to March 1942, GC&CS grew in size 
from 674 staff members to 1584, an increase of 910 individuals. Yet in the following nine 
months the agency had grown nearly twice as much again to 3,116, and in the following 
year grew by over 3,000 staff members reaching a total of 6,864 by December 1943.56 
Similarly, the total number of “runs” made by the agencies collective Bombe machines 
increased significantly each year as more machines were added to the pool and more 
efficient methods were established for their operation and administration. In 1941 Bombe 
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machines made a total of 1,344 runs, in 1942 this increased to 4,655, in 1943 to 9,193, 
and in 1944 to 15,303.57  
 
Of course, given the size of the machines and the staff necessary to operate them, one of 
the most serious bottlenecks was solving the problem of accommodating and 
administering the large number of machines and staff. Despite a considerable building 
programme on the Bletchley Park estate, to house the agency’s growing operations, little 
consideration had been given to the problem of housing the large Bombe machines. In 
1940, a purpose built building, named Hut 11, was constructed to house the machines. 
However, soon the building proved inadequate and two further buildings were 
constructed, Hut 11A and Hut 11B in 1942, to increase capacity for Bombes, and the 
provision of space for the training of new Bombe operators and office work.58 Earlier 
still, outstations at the nearby Wavendon and Adstock were established to house 
Bombes.59 Hut 11A opened in February 1942, but within a month, new plans for massive 
expansion in Bombe numbers exceeded the space provided by the new building and 
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available outstations, and proposals were made for the establishment of another new 
nearby facility to house as many as 49 new, upgraded, machines and as many as 640 
necessary workers.60  
 
These sites were selected according to a number of criteria. Initially, nearby sites were 
selected, within 25-30 miles of Bletchley Park and with good access to telephone and 
teleprinter communication. This was absolutely necessary to provide instruction from 
Bletchley Park’s cryptanalysts to these satellite stations. Secondly, they required grounds 
large enough to house the large machines, but also to house hundreds of Bombe operators 
who lived onsite. By the height of GC&CS’s expansion, in the winter of 1944, there were 
a total of five major outstations, three located near Bletchley Park at Wavendon, Gayhurst 
and Adstock, and two further afield at Stanmore and Eastcote. These sites, and Bletchley 
Park, housed the Bombe section which numbered 256 male Royal Air Force mechanics 
and 1,676 female Bombe operators, mainly members of the Women’s Royal Naval 
Service, by the end of the war.61  
 
**** 
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This expansion programme was, even after the reorganisation of the agency, prompted by 
wider developments outside of the agency’s control – a major upgrade to the German 
Naval Enigma system, known as M4, introduced in February 1942. The system altered 
some of the machines components and introduced a fourth wheel, increasing the number 
of possible settings by a factor of 26.62 The increased security provided meant that the 
existing Bombe machines, while not redundant, would take considerably longer to 
complete a run, as much as 150 days of Bombe time. At that time GC&CS was running 
twelve Bombe machines, this meant that even if all twelve machines were set to solving 
just one day’s settings, using the new system, it could take at least two weeks to make a 
successful run. Furthermore, that would also not leave any Bombe time for work on Heer 
(the ground forces of the Wehrmacht) and Luftwaffe (the air force of the Wehrmacht) 
material.63 Clearly this was unacceptable and new methods of attacking the problem 
would have to be developed. The development of solutions to this problem posed by M4 
produced one of the most bitter and protracted disputes to erupt among GC&CS and its 
contractors, and is worth describing in some detail. 
 
As it was, some tentative research was already being conducted by the physicist C.E. 
Wynn-Williams, on the development of a new, faster, Bombe machine. Unsurprisingly, 
the development of M4 added considerable impetus to this project. Wynn-William’s idea 
was to improve the existing Bombe machines with two attachments. A mechanical 
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commutator assembly, which incorporated a fourth wheel to the Bombe machine, and a 
vacuum tube in place of the old electromagnetic relays used by the old machine – this 
plug-in upgrade to the Bombe was dubbed Cobra.64 Meanwhile, Harold “Doc” Keen, the 
lead engineer working on the construction of Bombe machines at BTM, began designing 
his own four wheel Bombe machine in February 1942 and completed designs by the 
following month – dubbed Mammoth. This presented GC&CS with a dilemma; the Cobra 
system, while concluded to be problematic in a number of respects, it presented the 
swiftest solution to the problem posed by the M4. Mammoth, on the other hand, promised 
to be a more flexible machine that could be adapted to a wider variety of problems. 
GC&CS chose to invest efforts primarily into the Cobra system while also continuing to 
develop Mammoth as a “second bow” that could be applied to more difficult problems. It 
was initially decided to build 34 Cobras and only six Mammoths. 65  
 
However, Cobra development was fraught with problems. Gordon Welchman, who 
designed an important early improvement to the Bombe machines in 1940, complained 
that Wynn-Williams was,  
 
badly let down by his engineering advisers and the workshop in which the first 
prototype Cobra was built. He was led to suppose that the sensing was key to the 
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problem, whereas all subsequent (and previous) experience has shown that 
sensing is comparatively trivial, whereas the real difficulty was mechanical.66 
 
In other words, the engineers falsely concluded that the problem with Cobra was in its 
vacuum tube sensors when the real problem lay with the mechanical commutator 
assembly. Tommy Flowers, an engineer from the General Post Office (GPO), who would 
later go onto lead the team which would design and build Bletchley Park’s other towering 
technological achievement, Colossus computer, was brought into build the sensing unit. 
However, he went about redesigning the unit, causing friction with Wynn-Williams who 
suggested that Flower’s design was problematic in several different areas. Welchman, the 
head of GC&CS’s mechanisation programme, was brought in to mediate, but concluded 
that he lacked the technical expertise to come to a definitive conclusion without 
subjecting the prototypes to further experimentation.67  
 
Meanwhile, the Mammoth Machines were developing well, and by October the first of 
the machines had been constructed and began preliminary testing. This period of testing 
was aimed at discovering, and solving, problems in the design and manufacture before 
other machines underwent production. This early model was predicted to be able to 
complete a Bombe run in 22 minutes. At that time it was hoped that the vacuum tube, or 
valve, based sensor would be applicable to Keens machine, replacing the relays sensor 
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and reducing the time it would take to complete a run to 13 minutes. 68  However, Keen 
hoped to be able to produce a new relay sensor which was capable of achieving the same 
speeds projected for the valve sensor and set about attempting to design and construct that 
upgrade.69  
 
As noted, at that time, GC&CS was considering the possibility of mixing and matching 
the various components and machines undergoing design and production in the hope of 
creating an optimum machine, which they codenamed Centaur. The development of the 
Cobra Bombes continued, but remained problematic.70 By October, like Mammoth, a 
prototype had been built but had failed and projections suggested that a working 
prototype might not be available for a further eight weeks.71 Therefore, neither Flowers’ 
nor Wynn-William’s sensor was able to be adequately tested because of continued 
problems with the mechanical fourth wheel. 
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The situation rapidly changed in December 1942 when Bletchley’s cryptanalysts, using 
the old three-wheel Bombe machines, were able to make a break into M4. This altered the 
situation entirely; no longer did GC&CS need to rush a few machines into production as 
soon as possible. Instead, they could afford to take longer and fine tune the designs to 
produce better machines in quantity rather than build a few flawed machines quickly. At 
that stage, Welchman concluded that it would be better to focus on the BTM Mammoth 
machine, which was more adaptable.72 
 
However, Flowers and Radley still hoped to be able to test their sensor. A proposal was 
made to allow Flowers and his team to test his sensor on one of the new four-wheel 
Bombes developed by BTM.  However, the obvious objection to that was that it would 
consume valuable time experimenting with the new machines to find problems that 
would need to be ironed out of future machines, thus holding up production. Meanwhile, 
the problems with the Cobra still had yet to be resolved, leaving Flowers in the frustrating 
position of having a prototype sensor requiring testing, but no four-wheel unit upon 
which to perform those tests. This, therefore, delayed Flowers work by several months, 
and eventually Dr. Radley, who was Edward Travis’ engineering advisor and working 
with Flowers’ on the sensor,  went over Welchman’s head directly to Travis and 
requested a four wheel machine upon which tests could begin.73 This episode created 
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considerable tension among the various design teams, Welchman and Radley, which 
lasted several weeks and resulted in a number of recriminating letters and reports from 
both sides of the dispute. 
 
Radley and Flowers were provided the best machine BTM had developed, named 
Freemantle, and began testing in early May 1943.74 However, according to Welchman, 
they failed to abide by the instructions to keep a particular gear wheel well oiled, and they 
failed to do so. The result was a mechanical failure which badly damaged the machine, 
which required a month to repair.75 Radley, on the other hand contended “I cannot in any 
way agree with Welchman that it [the malfunction of the machine] was due to neglect or 
interference on the part of Flowers’ people.”76 Welchman also accused Flowers and 
Radley of having an agenda to prove the superiority of valve technology - rather than 
employing brief experiments to examine whether their own unit would work, which was 
their mandate, they wanted to perform unnecessary and lengthy tests to prove the 
superiority of the vacuum-tube over BTMs relays.77 Radley, on the other hand, argued 
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that those tests were absolutely necessary as was determining which method produced a 
more reliable machine.78  
 
Welchman also described a particularly heated meeting, in which Flowers argued that the 
relays required too much mechanical precision to work efficiently and that Welchman and 
Keen were “determined to use relays ‘at all costs’.”79 This was, of course, the reverse of 
the charge Welchman laid at Flowers’ door regarding his agenda to force vacuum tubes 
on GC&CS. According to Welchman, Flowers also attacked Keen’s competence as an 
engineer, 
 
The B.T.M. machine was thoroughly badly designed, Mr. Keen had created his 
own difficulties, and Mr. Flowers could not understand how anyone could have 
done the things that Mr. Keen had done. It was a scandal that after 15 months 
B.T.M. had not got a machine running.  
 
By this time of course Mr Flowers had had Freemantle for over a week and he 
said that the machine was hopeless and the timing all wrong.80 
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Flowers was supported in his attack on Keen by Radley, who proceeded to threaten to go 
over Welchman’s head once again, to Commander Travis, and demand that the entire 
B.T.M. project be placed in Flowers’ hands and given the opportunity to make the 
machine work. Welchman and Keen concluded that Flowers’ technical criticisms were 
“absurd” and that at least one assertion was “particularly stupid”, and strenuously 
defended the expertise of Keen and his team. Finally, Welchman concluded that Radley 
held too much influence over Commander Travis and that his, and Flowers’, influence 
“must be completely removed”.81 Welchman also recommended a full investigation of the 
dispute.82 
 
Eventually, the situation was resolved without an investigation, but only when Nigel De 
Grey, GC&CS’s second-in-command, stepped in, heard both sides of the story and 
cleared the air. Radley repudiated the charges he and Flowers’ had levelled at the 
competence of Keen and his company, and was granted the opportunity to continue 
experiments of Flowers’ sensor on the new four wheel Bombes. However, this only came 
with provision that neither Flowers nor any of his engineers physically touch any of 
BTM’s machines, and that all the work and maintenance be performed by BTM. This 
situation appears to have continued throughout the testing phase of the valve sensing 
apparatus. Eventually, a total of twelve Cobra Bombes were built, and despite the efforts 
of Flowers to convince Welchman of the merits of the vacuum tube sensors, as opposed 
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to relays, Welchman concluded that “The arguments in favour of valves turned out to be 
very weak indeed.”83 Following the refurbishment and upgrading of a number of the 
original machines, and following the production of new machines, the total number of 
Bombe machines available for operation by the end of 1943 comprised of 87 three-wheel 
Bombes and 95 four-wheel machines – however, it is important to note that of those 95 
four-wheel Bombes available, 75 were constructed by United States Naval cryptanalysis 
department – OP. 20 G.84  
 
***** 
 
The cryptanalytic alliance between Britain and the United States of America had a 
profound impact on cryptanalysis during the Second World War. Firstly, thanks to the 
Lend Lease programme, GC&CS was the direct beneficiary of approximately a million 
dollars worth of American equipment.85 Secondly, GC&CS had consistently battled 
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issues of funding, manpower and other materials throughout the war - particularly during 
the opening years. Cryptanalysts in the United States, on the other hand, enjoyed 
considerable access to resources. However, what they made up for in material wealth they 
lacked in experience and in access to wireless intercept stations. Nevertheless, despite the 
deficiencies on both sides of the Atlantic, the process of forming a cryptanalysis deal was 
both long and difficult in the making.86 Nevertheless, by the summer of 1942 Bletchley 
had decided to dispatch one of their most senior and gifted cryptanalysts, John Tiltman, to 
the United States to brief American cryptanalysts on British progress and methods.87 
 
Fully appraised of the problems Bletchley Park was having with the German naval 
Enigma system, combined with the heavy losses British and American shipping suffered 
at the hands of the U-Boats, US officials were determined to increase Bombe production. 
After some negotiation regarding the number of machines the US would build, US 
engineers began the process of designing their own prototype high-speed machine to 
tackle the four rotor problem. The US navy machine was a little different from its primary 
British counterpart, including a valve based sensor and a different number of drums. The 
machine could complete a four-wheel run in 20 minutes and a three-wheel run in a matter 
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of seconds. Furthermore, the British cryptanalysts were impressed with the machine 
which was deemed to be an improvement on British models.88   
 
Moreover, the US manufacturing industry was capable of a quality and speed of work 
which was beyond the resources of British manufacturers. Initial plans were drawn up in 
September 1942 and revised plans produced in January 1943, and by May 1st prototypes 
had been built. The design and production of the machines was awarded to the American 
National Cash Register Co. in Dayton, Ohio. The company was able to produce machines 
extremely quickly at a rate of two a week by the autumn of 1943. Obviously, this was far 
beyond the capacity of BTM. In the end, US Bombe production was limited to around 
125 machines.89 Initially, based on a not altogether rounded view of the problem posed by 
Enigma cryptanalysis, the aim had been to build over 300 machines in the initial order. 
However, discussion with experienced British experts, such as Alan Turing, soon led to a 
downward revision of the order to 96 Bombes.90 
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 The policy of the British and American cryptanalysts was that the US contribution 
towards German Naval traffic was that the US should be a junior partner. This would 
allow the US to place the weight of its assets behind the problem posed by Japanese 
traffic, while allowing British experience and expertise, which was two years ahead, took 
the lead. As Hugh Alexander described it, 
 
In the cryptographic field they [OP. 20 G] adopted from the beginning the clearly 
correct policy of supplementing our work rather than of attempting to cover the 
whole field themselves. With this end in view they set up a thoroughly efficient 
and businesslike organization but did not put in it their best cryptographers. They 
were taking the lead in Japanese cryptography in which there was an immense 
field to cover and it would have been wasteful to have put their outstanding 
technical experts on to the Enigma in which the main problems had been solved 
and in which we had several years start. Moreover they only intercepted a 
comparatively small amount of German traffic which was another severe 
handicap.91  
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Given the considerable Bombe capacity available in the United States, the policy was 
clearly a sensible one. When British Bombe time was exhausted, details of the various 
jobs outstanding, typically, but by no means restricted, to Naval work, would be 
communicated to OP. 20 G, run on their machines and returned to Bletchley Park within 
an hour.92 This ensured that US Bombe machines were being utilised, while also 
supplementing the limited availability of machines in Britain. It appears inconceivable 
that the British cryptanalysts, with their limited number of machines and relatively slow 
production programme, could have been as successful as they were without American 
help.  
 
****** 
 
In 1944, Gordon Welchman, looking back on GC&CS’s wartime performance, with the 
aim of informing future performance, summarised the successes and failures of the 
agency’s haphazard wartime programme of mechanisation with particular clarity. He 
rightly pointed to the mechanisation of GC&CS’s processes as of vital importance in the 
chief successes of the agency. However, he did include a highly perceptive caveat,  
We can claim to have made a pretty good show, but we must admit that in the 
early stages our handling of production was rather amateur and we did not realise 
the size of the maintenance problem. But we now know only too well that our 
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specialised machinery has only just been adequate for the problems. Small 
improvements in the enemy’s machine sand methods could and may yet defeat 
us.93  
 
The truth of all of these assertions is borne out by an examination of GC&CS’s successes 
and failures in the first half of the war. GC&CS was slow to get to grips with the Enigma 
problem, slower still to investigate mechanical solutions to the problem and, as 
Welchman observed, found it very difficult to mass produce those mechanical solutions. 
Considerable pressures were placed on the contractors GC&CS commissioned to build 
the machines, often because GC&CS was unsure regarding the direction it wished to 
pursue. A key example of both elements of Welchman’s critique, the fragility of 
GC&CS’s methods to alterations in Axis cipher machines and the mishandling of 
production, can be observed in the introduction of an Enigma system with a fourth-wheel. 
For a period of eighteen months, GC&CS vacillated regarding the construction of a 
mechanised solution which ultimately resulted in rival teams of engineers producing 
different sets of apparatus, wasting each other’s time and resources, and engaging in bitter 
conflict. Meanwhile, senior individuals within GC&CS, be it Welchman who backed 
BTM or Ridley who backed Tommy Flowers and his GPO team, took sides. It was only 
the escalation of the issue to GC&CS’s chief administrator and second-in-command, 
Nigel De Grey that an adequate resolution was found.  
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Of course, the sour period resulting from GC&CS’s attempts to deal with the problem 
posed by the addition of a fourth wheel to the Naval Enigma, was only one in a catalogue 
of problems revolving around the development and production of the Bombe machine. It 
must be recalled that, as we have seen, the agency met the prospect of designing and 
building a machine to address a cryptanalytic problem with considerable apprehension. It 
was only the intervention of individual like Frank Birch, an historian without a 
technocratic or scientific background, and Alan Turing, a theoretical mathematician and 
logician, that led to investigation into the Naval Enigma problem and championed 
investment in mechanical solutions. However, still more importantly Birch championed 
the problem because he understood the gravity of the problem in the face of war with 
Germany. Yet even once Bombe production was at last underway little thought and 
planning had been made to actually accommodate the machines and the vast number of 
personnel necessary to operate them. This resulted in the wholesale expansion of GC&CS 
beyond the gates of Bletchley Park. Furthermore, despite constant issues regarding time 
sharing between various sections of the agency, for use of the machines, no formal plan 
or agreement had been made to solve this problem until two years after the delivery of the 
first machine. The failure of the agency, and those in command of its mechanisation 
programme, to adequately plan how their new machines would be used is indicative of 
the wider attitude of the agency. The Bombe machines were built to solve a crisis, and 
resolution of the problems surrounding their use were only resolved in the face of new 
crises.  
 
Study of Bombe development also reveals much about the role of scientific expertise in 
GC&CS. It is interesting that the two key figures in obtaining the Bombe project the 
“green light” were Frank Birch and Edward Travis. These two individuals, both products 
of GC&CS’s collegiate era were not scientists, expert mechanisers or technocrats, but 
nevertheless they played an important role in identifying and arguing the case for 
mechanisation. Therefore, the agency’s scientists, like Turing and Welchman, designed 
the machines but the battle in the board room for the project was championed by two of 
the agency’s most senior figures, including its second-in-command. It is clear therefore, 
that mechanisation was pushed for by both scientists but also senior management within 
the agency. However, importantly, this key support was available only in times of crisis. 
This suggests that while pressure from scientists and support from the highest levels were 
essential, important factors emphasised by Agar and Edgerton respectively, perhaps the 
most important factor in mechanisation was a constant stream of crises to force the 
agency into action.  
 
To conclude, the mechanisation of Bletchley Park, and the difficulties discovered in the 
design and production of the Bombe machine, represents an excellent example of the 
wider development of GC&CS during wartime. The agency set about mechanising and 
professionalising a number of its processes as a means of solving problems and widening 
bottlenecks which restricted its capacity to successfully fulfil its mandate. It did not 
mechanise these process as part of a wider attempt to improve efficiency, instead 
mechanisation was characterised by incremental changes to GC&CS’s infrastructure and 
operations as new problems were identified and solutions developed. Clearly, successful 
long term planning was remarkably difficult and instead there were a series of ad hoc 
solutions to newly emergent problems. In the internal history of GC&CS written after the 
war, Frank Birch described the agency as a whole in a manner which is entirely reflected 
in its attempt to build the Bombe machines: GC&CS was like “a rudderless vessel 
buffeted about at the mercy of every wave of circumstance.”94  
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